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Private Security in Guatemala:  
Pathway to Its Proliferation 
Abstract 
It has become commonplace to explain the proliferation of private security services as 
causally determined by crime rates and institutional weakness. By contrast, this paper ar-
gues that another explanatory factor needs to be emphasized, especially for post-war so-
cieties: continuity and change of social control mechanisms. The paper first presents the 
current situation with commercial and noncommercial private security services in Guate-
mala (private security companies, as well as neighborhood security committees). Against 
this background, it reconstructs mechanisms and critical junctures by which the Guatema-
lan state sourced out policing functions to the private sector during the war, and traces the 
reinforcement of these mechanisms in the post-war society. It argues that the proliferation 
of private security services is an outcome of the overlapping of different political processes 
and sequences. The continuity of social control mechanisms thereby emerges as a stronger 
explanatory factor for this proliferation, rather than the common justification of high crime 
rates. 
 
Keywords: public security, private security companies, path dependency, post-war societies, 
Central America, Guatemala 
 
 
 
 
Otto Argueta, M.A. 
is a historian, a Ph.D. student at the GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies, and a 
DAAD scholar. 
Contact: argueta@giga-hamburg.de 
Website: http://staff.en.giga-hamburg.de/argueta 
GIGA WP 144/2010 
Zusammenfassung 
Private Sicherheitsdienstleistungen in Guatemala: Wie kam es zu ihrer Zunahme? 
Allgemein wird angenommen, dass die starke Zunahme der privaten Sicherheitsdienst-
leistungen als kausale Folge hoher Kriminalitätsraten und institutioneller Schwäche zu er-
klären ist. Demgegenüber wird in diesem Beitrag argumentiert, dass ein anderer Erklä-
rungsfaktor hervorgehoben werden muss, vor allem in Nachkriegsgesellschaften: die Kon-
tinuität und der Wandel der Mechanismen sozialer Kontrolle. Der Beitrag stellt zuerst die 
Situation kommerzieller und nichtkommerzieller privater Sicherheitsdienstleistungen 
(privater Sicherheitsunternehmen ebenso wie nachbarschaftlicher Sicherheitskomitees) in 
Guatemala dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden anschließend Mechanismen und kriti-
sche Zeitpunkte rekonstruiert, angesichts derer der guatemaltekische Staat während des 
Krieges Polizeiaufgaben ausgelagert hat, und es wird nachgezeichnet, wie sich diese Me-
chanismen in der Nachkriegszeit fortsetzten und verstärkten. Die Folgerung daraus lautet, 
dass die starke Zunahme der privaten Sicherheitsdienstleistungen als Ergebnis eines In-
einandergreifens verschiedener politischer Prozesse interpretiert werden muss. Die Konti-
nuität bestimmter Mechanismen sozialer Kontrolle zeichnet sich dabei als wichtigerer Er-
klärungsfaktor ab als hohe Verbrechensraten. 
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1 Introduction 
Beginning in 1986, Guatemala embarked on a political period marked by a succession of ci-
vilian governments elected through democratic procedures. With the exception of Serrano 
Elías’s coup in 1993, Guatemala was clearly moving toward an electoral democracy in the 
context of an internal war and strong authoritarian structures (McCleary 1997). The signing 
of the Peace Agreements in 1996 ended the longest internal war in Central America. The in-
stitutional reforms embodied in the Peace Agreements addressed the main security institu-
tions such as the army, the National Police, and intelligence agencies. The Security Sector Re-
form (SSR) was implemented to overcome a militarized and counterinsurgent conception of 
security. The transformation of political institutions and the SSR were part of a more general 
process of liberal peacebuilding. The security sector transformations sought to strengthen 
civil institutions designed to control and prevent crime in a democratic society, as well as fo-
cus on the public function of security. However, these institutional and political processes 
failed in different aspects: 1) in addressing the increase and diversification of crime; 2) in 
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preventing the subsequent uncontrolled private responses to it, such as lynching,1 vigilan-
tism, social cleansing,2 and neighborhood organizations; and 3) in controlling the prolifera-
tion of private security companies (PSCs). 
There are 289 PSCs operating in Guatemala. From those, 189 are authorized by the Min-
istry of Interior3 and approximately 100 function without permission. Existing records illus-
trate the growth of the private security sector. In the 1990s, there were between 70 and 80 PSCs. 
By 2004, 170 active companies were reported, of which only 82 were authorized by the gov-
ernment (Táger 2002:103). It was estimated as well that 31 were illegal PSCs.4 The number of 
authorized agents in 2004 was 60,000. However, taking into account the 99 remaining compa-
nies pending authorization, the estimated number of agents could have been 106,7005 — or 
five times higher than the total number of police officers. In 2007, there were 36,000 police and 
military personnel. From the police’s point of view, there were 30,000 officers, of which 4,000 
were assigned to administrative matters; the rest were divided into two 24-hour shifts for street 
patrol. Therefore, only 8,000 police officers were available on a day-by-day basis to bring pub-
lic security to a population of 12 million Guatemalans (641 inhabitants per police officer).6 
                                                     
Private security companies proliferated in parallel to the transition to democracy and 
security sector reform — but without accountability mechanisms, and without a significant 
impact on crime reduction. Which factors explain this proliferation of private security? Con-
ventional wisdom argues that the weakness of state security institutions and the increase of 
crime are to blame (Johnston 1999; Kempa 1993). 
Taking the case of Guatemala as an example, I argue that the transition to democracy 
produced a formal institutional reform of the security sector, which, in turn, allowed former 
military personnel to maintain informal mechanisms of control through the private sector. 
Although the proliferation of private security began accelerating in 1996, the roots of the 
phenomenon are older. I propose that private security should be analyzed as an outcome of 
multiple reinforcement mechanisms that overlap in different temporal sequences. The em-
phasis is on the historical delegation of security functions by the state to private security or-
ganizations, and the continuity of control mechanisms. The central argument is that the pro-
1  Between 1996 and 2001, there were more than 421 cases of lynching in Guatemala. MINUGUA: “Los lincha-
mientos, un flagelo que persiste”, 2002. 
2  In 2005, there were more than 70 cases of homicide exhibiting characteristics of “social cleansing”, such as the 
use of torture, death stroke, messages into the bodies, among others. These characteristics were defined in a 
special report of the Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos de Guatemala: “Las características de las 
muertes violentas en el país” (2006). Online: <www.pdh.org.gt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& 
id=90&Itemid=139>. 
3  Data provided by Registro Mercantil de Guatemala, March 2009. 
4  “Crece venta de seguridad privada” Prensa Libre, January 20, 2006. 
5  Informe de Desarrollo Humano para Centroamérica 2009–2010, UNDP. 
6  By comparison, Costa Rica has 350 inhabitants per police officer; El Salvador, 332; Nicaragua, 557; Panama, 
195; and Haiti, 1,889. Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano para América Central 2009–2010, PNUD, p. 232. 
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liferation of private security has its origins inside public security institutions, and that the 
displacement of security functions reinforces the selection of private security due to political 
context and necessities. This paper seeks to identify the different mechanisms responsible for 
the proliferation of private security in Guatemala, both commercial PSCs and noncommercial 
civil security organizations. 
Private security is considered a sociopolitical function in which nonstate security actors 
implement actions to protect themselves or the community. From a sociological perspective, 
private security is a segment of private policing that involves both commercial and noncom-
mercial organizations (Johnston 1992; Shering and Stenning 1987). The concept of private po-
licing shows how the theoretical distinction between public and private do not match with 
the large and complex forms of policing in particular cultural and historical contexts (Shering 
and Stenning 1987: 14). 
The case of Guatemala shows that the historical reinforcement of private security 
weakened the effectiveness of public institutions because they were used as part of the coun-
terinsurgent strategy and as a labor reserve for PSCs. Public security institutions, in a hybrid 
political regime, have to compete with a strong private security sector operating outside the 
democratic rule of law. Private security in Guatemala shows how informal authoritarian so-
cial control mechanisms reinforce themselves within the democratic process and provide 
continuity for former military and police officers in security matters. The culture of control 
(Garland 2005) — in which informal social control mechanisms adopt policing functions such 
as surveillance — is understood as a wide field involving state and nonstate practices and 
forms of crime control rooted in daily social activities that preserve a particular social order 
(Garland 2005: 38). This governmental process involves the enlistment of others, the shaping 
of incentives, and the creation of new forms of operative action. It is a part of a “responsibili-
zation” strategy that extends the scope of public institutions by linking them with the prac-
tices of private actors and communities (Garland 2005: 213). 
In general, it appears that historical trajectories (authoritarian regimes, internal wars, 
political instability) can explain the origins and evolution of private security services. I adopt 
a path-dependent analysis to identify the mechanisms through which the state has displaced 
its functions to the private, reinforcing it as a particular institutional selection. In this sense, 
the strengthening of public security institutions as part of the liberal peacebuilding process 
seems to be hampered by the existence of a strong private security sector that pre-dates the 
post-war increase in crime. An interplay of mechanisms of reproduction and critical junc-
tures define the pathway to the proliferation of private security. The democratization process 
in Guatemala created an opportunity for the reactivation of organizational structures linked 
with security matters. The private security sector agglutinated these structures through his-
torical mechanisms in which different actors in different sequences introduced themselves in 
a particular institutional selection. The mechanisms that reproduce the selection are under-
stood as preceding steps in a particular direction, which consequently induce further move-
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ment in the same direction (Pierson 2000: 252). These mechanisms reinforce a previous insti-
tutional selection, raise the cost of shifting it, and reduce the possibility of other institutional 
arrangements being selected at a certain critical juncture (Pierson 2004: 20). They emerge 
from historical circumstances that cause a particular institutional selection, and consequently 
define the self-reinforcing character of the path (Pierson 2004: 46). 
By analyzing the proliferation of private security as an outcome of historical political 
processes, this paper intends to contribute to the debate about transformation processes in 
post-war societies (Kurtenbach 2010). The existence of a strong private security sector tends 
to introduce authoritarian practices into the restructuring of post-war political systems, 
thereby reducing the autonomy and legitimacy of public security institutions. 
In Section 2, I discuss the current state of private security studies in order to bring an 
analytical base to the study of private security in Central America, and in Guatemala in par-
ticular. Section 3 describes the situation of PSCs in Guatemala, and in particular, state con-
trols, regulations and the governmental roots of private security companies. Section 4 ex-
plains the noncommercial private security and its relation with crime rates. The paper ends 
with the identification of the reinforcement mechanism that has led to the proliferation of 
private security in Guatemala.7 
2 Unresolved Issues Regarding Research on Private Security 
There is extensive literature on private security, especially on the current conditions of com-
panies in societies with Security Sector Reform programs. Some analysis has been based on 
private security spending, and has noted that it normally exceeds investment in public secu-
rity.8 In conflict and post-conflict societies like Israel, Russia, the Philippines, and South Af-
rica, the private security sector is the main employer of security personnel. The same situa-
tion exists in highly developed countries such as the USA, Great Britain, and some central 
European countries (Holmqvist 2005). 
Some authors argue that the global tendency toward security privatization is a result of 
public sector reductions, as well as changes in the nature of conflicts after the end of the Cold 
War. These tendencies are deepened by the reduction of personnel, institutional weakness, 
chronic insecurity, and low-quality police (Richards 2007; SEESAC 2005). Excessive confi-
                                                     
7  The interviews cited in this paper were conducted in Guatemala between February and March 2009 with PSC 
owners, members of JLS, and security experts. The documentary material comes from the Historical Archive 
of the National Police in Guatemala, recently opened in March 2009. 
8  Richards (2007), Addressing the role of private security companies within security sector reform programmes; 
Gibson (2007), Regulated private security companies versus a professional security sector: a cautionary tale; 
Richards and Smith (2007), Addressing the role of private security sector reform programmes”; Holmqvist 
(2005) Private Security Companies, The case for Regulation; Clifford and Kempa (2000), The Role of “Private 
Security” in transitional Democracies, among others. 
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dence in the private security sector enhances institutional weakness, which leads to an un-
equal security distribution and access to public services. This, in turn, creates a false security 
perception and an inappropriate evaluation of real security necessities. This situation weak-
ens the building of state security institutions and their legitimacy (Holmqvist 2005:12). 
Another important theme in the literature is the absence of national and international 
regulations.9 The efficient regulation of PSCs could help bring public security to societies 
that otherwise lack state security institutions. On the contrary, it may work as an obstacle to 
the construction of democratic institutions in post-conflict societies. The current regulations 
enhance the lack of governability and accountability, especially when they delegate central 
state functions (Richards 2007). 
                                                     
Jeffrey Isima (2007) analyzed the case of Sub-Saharan Africa and argues that while 
strong states have the capability to retain core functions such as security provisions, weak 
states transfer these functions to the private sector, both locally and internationally. The low 
capacity of states to bring efficient and effective security has created a vacuum of security, 
which the private sector has “filled” as a response to a genuine citizen demand of security 
(2007:2). But it is not only the absence of regulation that is a concern. The lack of profession-
alism of private security agents has been the cause of violations of human rights and corrup-
tion (Gibson 2007; Perrin 2006). 
A comparison between Angola and Afghanistan shows the different effects of private 
security and different paths to its proliferation. In Afghanistan, the majority of PSCs are 
transnational and began their operations as security services for businessmen and interna-
tional executives. In contrast, PSCs in Angola are mostly local and proliferated during the 
peace negotiations to end the civil war. Rebel groups and the government both hired com-
mercial military entrepreneurs (Joras and Schuster 2008). These cases show how context, po-
litical trajectories and conflicts determine different paths to the proliferation of PSCs. 
Latin America is a good example of how historical trajectories (authoritarian regimes, 
internal wars, and political instability) can explain the origins of private security services. Af-
ter the military withdrawal from public security institutions, institutionalized criminality 
(criminality in the public institutions) grew as a new form of criminality in a majority of 
Latin American countries. Nonpolitical forms of criminality were covered by the political 
violence, and nonstate security actors filled the security vacuum created by the withdrawal 
of military forces (Diamint 1988). Institutional weakness coincided with a rise in crime and 
corruption in the security sector. The corporative response of military and former military 
personnel in defense of their privileges led them to resist the civil sector and to boycott the 
democratization process (Diamint 1988:92). 
9  Gibson (2007), Regulated private security companies versus a professional security sector: a cautionary tale; 
Issima (2007), Regulating the Private Security Sector Governance in Africa; Holmqvist (2005), Private Security 
Companies, The case for Regulation. 
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The proliferation of nonstate armed actors in post-war societies (some of them with a 
military past) is considered a basis of the post-war violence.10 The decade of the 1990s trans-
formed the military function into corps of security and intelligence advisors for civil gov-
ernments (Kruijt 2004: 758). 
Arias (2009: 23) identifies that one of the main problems related to the private security 
sector in Latin America is the emergence of hybrid or mixed spaces between public and pri-
vate, where the functions of public and private security overlap. A clear definition of spaces 
and functions of private and public security is directly related with the institutional capabili-
ties of the states. 
The consulted bibliography shows that there is a concern about the general situation of 
private security services in post-war societies, especially in regards to their regulations, profes-
sionalization, and control. There is an attempt to identify the effects of the private sector on 
post-war societies, especially on the rule of law and the legitimacy of democratic institutions. 
However, there is a lack of explanations regarding the continuities and changes to these ser-
vices, pre-existing conditions, the importance of social and political contexts, institutional evo-
lution, and reinforcement mechanisms that encourage the selection of private security services. 
2.1 From Democratic Promise to Private Security Proliferation: Private Security in Central 
America 
The proliferation of PSCs is an extended phenomenon in Latin America. In 2003, the total 
number of authorized private guards in the region was 1.63 million, and 2.5 million in 2007 
(Arias 2009: 23). Frigo (2006) calculates that in 2006, approximately 2 million were unauthor-
ized private guards. In relation to the number of private security personnel, Central Ameri-
can nations are number three on the continent. When viewed in terms of the total popula-
tion, the ratio of private security agents has a stronger impact, especially where the number 
of state policeman is lower.11 
Central America exhibits special characteristics when it comes to the study of private 
security services, such as the existence of strong “political armies”12, internal wars (Koonings 
and Kruijt 2003), and post-war contexts in which authoritarian enclaves and democratic 
processes coexist. In other words, the process of liberal peacebuilding in Central America has 
not achieved its objectives (full democratic guarantees, social peace, and democratic rule of 
                                                     
10  There is an extensive literature on nonstate armed actors. See Guzmán 1993; Jaramillo 1993; Salazar 1993; 
Kruijt 2004; Alba Vega 2007; Kurtenbach 2003; Koonings 2004. 
11  In 2007, the total number of police officers in Central America was 71,955 (193 police officers per hundred 
thousand inhabitants). Calculated using OCAVI data, <www.ocavi.com/index.php?mod=docs_summary&cat_ 
id=44&country_id=4&page=0&order_by=pubdate>. 
12  Koonings and Kruijt define political armies as military institutions that consider political participation and con-
trol over internal politics as a central task of legitimate functions. More about this concept in Koonings, Kees and 
Dirk Kruijt (eds) (2003), Ejércitos políticos: las fuerzas armadas y la construcción de la nación en la era de la democracia. 
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law) due to the persistence and interplay of historical political processes, namely the socio-
economic context, war, and post-war transformation processes (Kurtenbach 2010: 18). 
Table 1: Guards Hired by PSCs in Latin America 
Country Inhabitant Number of guards Guards per  
hundred thousand inhabitants 
Police officers per  
hundred thousand inhabitants 
Brazil   177.3 million    580,000 327  146** 
Mexico   103.3 million    450,000 435 324* 
Central America    38.4 million    234,941 611     187**** 
Colombia    44.5 million    190,000 427  266** 
Argentina    38.4 million    110,000 286 549* 
Venezuela 27 million      65,000 240   429*** 
Peru    26.9 million      55,000 204  234** 
Chile    15.7 million      60,000 382  225** 
Total   471.5 million 1,744,941 370  
Notes: *2003; **2004; *** 2007; ****2008. 
Source: Author’s own compilation with data from Arias (2009): Seguridad Privada en América Latina: el lucro y 
los dilemas de una regulación deficitaria, FLACSO/Chile; Informe de Desarrollo Humano 2009–2010, 
UNDP; Observatorio Centroamericano sobre Violencia; Policía Nacional de Colombia; Comisión Nacio-
nal para la Reforma Policial de Venezuela (CONAREPOL). 
The proliferation of PSCs in post-war Central America occurred in parallel to the peace nego-
tiation process. Although Honduras did not have an internal conflict like Guatemala, El Sal-
vador and Nicaragua, the country was the operations center of counterinsurgent groups 
sponsored by the US Government. The military sector grew without controls or international 
observation. Honduras did not implement a security sector reform, and crime rose at the 
same rate as in the rest of the region. The private security sector grew because of the political 
violence in neighboring nations (Castellanos 2003). 
The proliferation of private security during the transition to democracy did not have an 
impact on crime. Homicide rates in Guatemala and El Salvador increased between 1999 and 
2002. By comparison, crime in Costa Rica and Nicaragua was more stable and much lower.13 
Records kept on PSCs in Central America vary greatly in each country. In El Salvador, 
records include a wide variety of private security services — something that does not happen 
in other countries.14 In Guatemala, existing laws regulate only those services with police-like 
structures. Individual private guards and private investigations are not included in the re-
cords. These sorts of deficiencies in the records make impossible to draw a realistic picture of 
the private security sector’s dimensions, i.e. the number of commercial and noncommercial, 
formal and informal private organizations. 
                                                     
13  There are different factors that explain the different situation of Nicaragua and Costa Rica respect the rest of the 
region. From a discourse analysis perspective see Huhn, Oettler and Peetz (2006); Kurtenbach (2008 and 2010). 
14  Existing laws regulating private security services in El Salvador define their services in a broader sense than 
other countries in Central America. La Seguridad Privada en Centroamérica. Fundación Arias para la Paz y el 
Progreso Humano, Mai 2003. 
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Table 2: Homicide Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants in Central America by Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Guatemala 21 20 21 29 26 18 28 30 32 37 38 44 47 45 48 
El Salvador – 46 45 38 44 38 45 40 39 40 49 62 65 57 52 
Nicaragua   6 –   6   6   6   7   9 10 10 12 12 13 13 13 13 
Honduras – – – – – – – – 69 65 35 37 46 50 58 
Costa Rica   6   5   6   6   6   7   6   6   6   7   7   8   8   8 11 
Latin America 20 20 21 20 21 21 22 23 23 22 21 18 25 20 – 
Source: Author’s own compilation with data from Mapa de violencia: los jóvenes en América Latina, 2008. Red 
de información tecnológica Latinoamericana, RITLA. Instituto Sangari, Ministerio de Justicia, Brasil. Da-
ta from 2000, Informe de desarrollo humano 2009–2010: abrir espacios a la seguridad ciudadana y el de-
sarrollo humano, United Nations Development Program. 
For these reasons, private security in Guatemala has been handled from a descriptive per-
spective (Táger 2002), as well as from a judicial point of view (MINUGUA 2002; 
CDDHHCEC 2004). These studies agree that the expansion of the private security sector is 
not only a result of new forms of criminality, but also weaknesses in state security institu-
tions, and a strong army presence in Guatemalan society. Another aspect of private security 
studies relates to noncommercial security organizations, which vary depending on historical 
and contextual factors (Lambach 2007). 
Figure 1: Record of Legal Private Security Companies 
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Source: Author’s own compilation with data from La seguridad privada en Centro América, Fundación Arias para 
la Paz y el Progreso Humano (2003) de 2002–2004: Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2005, UNPD. 
There is a strong tendency in Latin America to organize neighborhood security committees. 
According to recent research, when such organizations originate with public institutions, the 
links between public force and population tend to strengthen in a collaborative manner. These 
organizations have different names, but serve the same informal social control function. Ex-
amples include: neighborhood preventive councils in Buenos Aires; local security fronts in Bo-
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gotá; citizens’ committees in Mexico City; community security councils in Saõ Paulo; and 
neighborhood committees in San José, Costa Rica (Arriagada 2000; Frühling 2003). 
Violent actions promoted by neighborhood and communal organizations are consid-
ered related to the concept of vigilantism. These sorts of coordinated neighborhood patrols 
can result in repressive actions based on “undesirability” or criminal presumption (Ávila 
2005). It often results in the transfer of crime from one area to another, rather than its preven-
tion or eradication, and becomes an informal mechanism of social control (Klein 1989). 
The displacement of a state’s security function to the citizenry has been studied as a 
historical practice that has accompanied the formation of nation-states since the end of the 
nineteenth century. Negotiations between the state and its (nonstate) collaborators expanded 
the state’s authority in exchange for indirect benefits, such as power, riches, and goods (Hol-
den 1996:441). These collaborative forms — vigilante groups, civil patrols, and security 
neighborhood committees — are linked with nonstate armed organizations for self-defense. 
The objective of the self-defense function is to protect a community against aggressions, both 
from state security groups or insurgent armed organizations (Gottschalk 2005; Bénit-Gbaffou 
2008). This was a dominant situation in Central America during the 1980s and 1990s. Today 
PSC hiring depends on economic status. When such status is lacking, social organizations 
form spontaneously. Both commercial and noncommercial private security, as well as the 
massive provision of legal and illegal operations, define the wave of security privatization af-
ter internal wars and authoritarian regimes (Mandel 2001). 
3 Private Security Companies in Guatemala: Conditions, Law, and Controls 
Guatemala’s spending on private security in 200515 was US$574.3 million dollars (1.8 percent 
of the GDP). From this, private homes spent 29.4 percent, and companies, the rest. By con-
trast, a reduction in the public sector is clear given the low investment on internal security 
(US$234.6 million in 2005).16 It was not until 1999 that the internal security budget exceeded 
the military defense budget and the trend was irregular regardless.17 
The budget allocations for internal security never covered the full necessities of institu-
tions like the National Civil Police or civil intelligence. The available data shows that in 2005 
private security spending exceeded the budgets of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 
of Defense. 
                                                     
15  There is no reliable information for the following years. 
16  At 2005 exchange rates. Online: <www.banguat.gob.gt/cambio/historico.asp?kmoneda=02&ktipo=5&kdia=01& 
kmes=01&kanio=2005&kdia1=01&kmes1=12&kanio1=2005&submit1=Consultar>. 
17  The internal security budget is presented here as a global amount, but because the Internal Ministry in Gua-
temala has another activities unrelated to security matters (governmental editorial, department of migration, 
lotteries, public celebrations, etc), the specific budget for security matters is lower. 
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Figure 2: Percentage Relationship between Public Spending in the Ministry of Defense 
and Ministry of Interior and Central Government Spending (in percent) 
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Source: De León-Escribano, Carmen (2004) Presupuesto de defensa en Guatemala, Instituto de enseñanza para el 
desarrollo sostenible, IEPADES and <www.minfin.gob.gt/index.php?option=com_content&view=section 
&id=28&Itemid=110>. 
Figure 3: Ministries' Budgets and Spending on Private Security Guatemala 2005 (in 
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Source: Author’s own compilation with data from De León-Escribano, Carmen (2004) Presupuesto de defensa en 
Guatemala, Instituto de enseñanza para el desarrollo sostenible, IEPADES; United Nations Development 
Programm (2006): Costo económico de la violencia en Guatemala, Programa de seguridad ciudadana y 
prevención de la violencia, UNDP. The currency exchange rate in 2005 was 7.57 Quetzales to one USD. 
Information available at: <www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/buscar.asp?query=bcos>. 
Most of the security companies operating in Guatemala are local, meaning that they were 
founded in Guatemala. The small number of transnational companies (for example G4S) can 
be differentiated only by their particular brand; they operate in the same manner as local 
companies. These kinds of companies relinquished international quality standards, and re-
produced the logic and mechanisms of the local private security market. (“Without this rejec-
tion, the international companies could not have the ability to compete in a market with its 
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own rules.”)18 These informal rules are directly related to the situation of the records and 
controls carried out by state institutions. 
The Guatemalan government has few possibilities for effectively controlling the private 
sector. Guatemalan laws that regulate the private sector do not include personal private se-
curity services (generally delivered by one person in coordination with others, but not inte-
grated into a formal company) in their legal definition of private security. For this reason, the 
number of private security organizations can only be estimated. Laws regulating the activi-
ties of PSCs were passed in 1970, and in 1979 the government issued a decree that regulated 
the activities of State Security Forces and Private Banks (Táger 2002:105; MINUGUA 2002:74). 
During the 1970s, PSCs concentrated mostly on the provision of guards. The diversification 
of services became characteristic of PSCs in the 1990s, which is an aspect that existing laws 
do not regulate adequately, along with hiring criteria, professionalization, and training. 
PSCs are legally authorized to operate when they have a Ministerial Agreement. The 
process for obtaining this document requires a substantial investment of time and money to 
meet the long list of legal requirements. The process can take up to three years, but a bribe 
can reduce it to a few months, depending on the owner’s former military rank and on the 
size of the bribe.19 The law allows for a company to operate while the authorization is in 
process. This situation could be postponed for years if an owner doesn’t have an interest in 
finalizing the process. A common practice for operating without authorization is to rent a 
Ministerial Agreement from companies that have two or more of them. This mechanism is 
called “coverage” and generates extra income for these companies. Aside from renting an au-
thorization, illegal companies also rent uniforms, guns and agents from other companies.20 
The Division for Supervision and Control of Companies, Entities and Private Security 
Persons (División de Supervisión y Control de Empresas, Entidades y Personas Individuales 
de Seguridad Privada; onwards “Supervision Division”) is the only agency within the Na-
tional Civil Police with responsibility for controlling PSCs. This unit is understaffed and is 
only able to control authorized companies (unauthorized companies do not have records in 
the institution regarding the number of agents, arms, services, etc.). One consultant of the Su-
pervision Division identified the absence of identification of agents and arms as the most 
pressing problems. For this reason, when the police capture illegal agents, it is only possible 
to prosecute them for illegal possession of arms. The only potential losses for a company are 
its guns, which are subject to confiscation. A company may therefore prefer to buy a new gun, 
rather than providing legal advice to an incriminated guard.21 Due to high levels of corrup-
                                                     
18  Interview with Jorge Sierra, ALMO Group. Guatemala, March 2, 2009. 
19  Interview with an advisor of the División de Supervisión y Control de Empresas, Entidades y Personas Indi-
viduales de Seguridad Privada, Guatemala, March 12, 2009. 
20  Interview with an advisor of the División de Supervisión y Control de Empresas, Entidades y Personas Indi-
viduales de Seguridad Privada, Guatemala, March 12, 2009. 
21  Ibid. 
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tion in the Police, PSCs consider the Supervision Division as a mechanism for avoiding state 
controls. “The unit of control is necessary, but, more important, when it is neutralized.”22 This 
means that the existence of the Supervision Division as a public institution is important as 
long as its work does not interfere with the activities of illegal private security companies. 
Another problem faced by the Supervision Division arises when a control officer tries 
to carry out a control visit to a PSC. In that case, the owner imposes his former military rank, 
thereby avoiding legitimate controls that could uncover illegalities. Because company own-
ers and higher-level employees are often former military or police officers, they enjoy respect 
and authority due to the structure of hierarchies, despite their new job status.23 
Tax evasion is another problem associated with PSCs. The Director of Institutional 
Planning and Development of the Superintendence for Tax Administration (SAT), explained 
that PSCs are taxed depending on the type of economic activity the companies perform. For 
tax purposes, companies can be registered as a cleaning and repair service business and offer 
security services on the side, for example. They are not legally required to specify the ser-
vices they offer. 
Another tax evasion strategy is to hire security personnel as freelancers. Freelancers 
have no social security guaranties, or a permanent labor relationship with the company. Both 
factors reduce a company’s tax burden. Once an employee is dismissed, the company may 
keep the tax file active to use it to hide other illegal activities, for example the purchase of 
guns and ammunition.24 
In 2001, the SAT reported 144 private security companies. In 2008, the number of PSCs 
was 289. The SAT has more PSCs registered than the Ministry of Interior, which means more 
tax control but weaker security and quality controls. Companies that may be illegal for secu-
rity reasons are still legal for tax reasons. 
Despite the increase in the number of registered companies, the tax paid by these com-
panies has decreased as a percentage of GDP. There are different factors that explain this 
phenomenon, namely the size of the companies, the way in which personnel is hired, tax 
revenue mechanisms, and tax evasion, among others. My interest is to show how the variety 
of mechanisms to create PSCs — and the weak institutional capabilities to control them — 
can be a strong factor behind the informal actions of PSCs. Tax evasion contributes to the 
high profitability of private security businesses, and for this reason Guatemala is considered 
a “paradise of non-regulated PSCs”.25 
A good example for illustrating the PSC situation in Guatemala is the Ébano Group, 
which started operations in 1979 as private security service for the banking sector in response 
                                                     
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Interview with Ing. Manfredo Chocano, Director of Institutional Planning and Development, Superintenden-
cia de Administración Tributaria (SAT) Guatemala, February 19, 2009. 
25  “¿Están ellos preparados?” Prensa Libre, October 10, 2004. 
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to a wave of bank robberies and insurgent groups attacks. The company employed National 
Police officers, paid their salaries directly to the Police Chief and gave them company uni-
forms. Ébano has since diversified its activities, creating different companies for each secu-
rity area: PROVAL for high-value and TRANSVAL for lower-value transportation, and 
Linker Monitoreo for monitoring geopositioning. These subsidiaries are not registered as 
PSCs but offer private investigation services, property protection consultation, the rescuing 
of people and goods, etc.26 All of these services are provided by informally hiring police of-
ficers and investigators from the Public Ministry. 
Figure 4: Number of PSCs and Tax Revenue from PSCs as a Percentage of the GDP 
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Source: Author’s own compilation with data provided by SAT. The percentage of the GDP was calculated using 
the GDP deflator of 2001 to adjust the tax revenue to the inflation index. The fiscal deficit in 2008 corre-
sponded to 1.6 of the GDP. Online: <www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/main.asp?id=36512&aud=1&lang=1>. 
A marketing study conducted by one of these security companies showed that 89 percent of au-
thorized PSCs offer guard services and 26 percent offer electronic security systems and guards. 
Nonetheless, 69 percent of the companies studied do not have records of their operations.27 
There are two reasons for this: the companies are illegal, or they started without originally offer-
ing security services. Because electronic and investigative security services are offered under the 
cover of other companies, they are not defined as security services and therefore not monitored. 
An interviewee described Ébano’s hiring process as follows. The company sets up a 
stand in poor rural communities. Applicants must be between 18 and 25 years old. Selected 
applicants are then taken to the company’s central offices in the city. The company first re-
views an applicant’s documentation and performs a short background check, then adminis-
ters medical and psychological tests, as well as a polygraph test. The applicant must know 
how to read, write and speak Spanish, and be at least 1.65 meters tall. It’s not unusual for an 
applicant to complete an employment application with the help of administrative staff, due 
                                                     
26  Interview with Jorge Sierra, ALMO Group. Guatemala, March 2, 2009. The Public Ministry is responsible for 
criminal investigations and prosecution in Guatemala. 
27  Ibid. 
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to educational limitations. Once the above requirements have been met, the applicant re-
ceives a two-day training on security procedures, laws, and weapons. 
There are two different types of guards. The first type is a typical guard with a shotgun 
who has no experience in security issues and weapons. This sort of guard costs less and used 
widely. His service offers the protection of life and property by displacing crime to areas 
without guards. This is a deterrence function more than a preventive one. Legal and profes-
sional restrictions limit these guards from executing preventive security actions. If the client 
wants to hire a guard with weapon experience, he must pay the weapons training offered by 
the same security company. This second type is the VIP guard, which is generally an ex-
military officer with full training in security and weapons usage. This sort of guard is the 
most expensive of all. 
PSCs owners have traditionally rejected legal reforms by arguing that existing controls 
are sufficient, and that the minimum age to use weapons is 18 years (the legal minimum to-
day is now 25 years). In addition, they reject the minimum wage set for guards. A normal 
guard earns Quetzals 1,000 monthly (approximately US$130) for 10 hours of work daily.28 
Company owners further claim that it is increasingly difficult to find young people with 
military experience and “the mystique and discipline of the army.”29 This was not the case in 
previous years, but since the abolition of the obligatory military service and the downsizing 
of the army these sorts of employees are difficult to find. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
army was the “training school of PSCs.”30 
The current situation with private security companies in Guatemala reflects how the 
historical displacement of state security functions limits the capabilities of public security in-
stitutions, especially in regards to controlling PSCs. The existence of a weak public security 
sector has benefited private security sector profitability, and grants it de facto legal impunity. 
The increase in crime since 1996 stimulated the public’s demand for security. The interaction 
of political change processes and security institution reform have transformed the private se-
curity sector into a mechanism for profitably controlling security matters. 
3.1 The State Roots of Private Security Companies 
There are strong and complex historical links between private security and state security in-
stitutions that are often overlooked, but are nevertheless very important because they explain 
the proliferation of private security as an outcome of political processes (as opposed to a re-
sponse to crime rates). As I will show in the following pages, the main reinforcement mecha-
nisms for the PSC proliferation have their origins in public institutions via the army, the po-
lice, and international advisors. 
                                                     
28  “Pésimas condiciones”, Prensa Libre, May 15, 2006. 
29  “¿Están ellos preparados?”, Prensa Libre, October 10, 2004. 
30  Ibid. 
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During Guatemala’s internal war, the military strengthened its control over national se-
curity, and permitted state security institutions to offer private security services. In the early 
1970s, the National Police was reformed with the aim of converting it into a counterinsurgent 
force under the direction of the Army.31 That included the formalization of pre-existing pri-
vate security services offered by police and civilians. According to available data, the first 
PSC authorization was made on 3 August 1970 and was named “Policía Privada de Investi-
gaciones Valiente” (Valiente Private Police for Investigations). It was owned by Manuel de 
Jesús Valiente Tellez, a highly ranked Judicial Police (Policía Judicial) officer who persecuted 
political leaders, students, union activists and other social movement members during the in-
ternal war. The authorization act emphasizes that consent was given to promote “the conti-
nuity of its activities […]”.32 This suggests that the company had been operating before its 
authorization. The National Police’s Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (COPC) was in charge 
of PSC operative and administrative efforts. The unit was created in 1972, and it was the 
nexus of the Army’s operative and intelligence units. The COPC was in charge of police per-
sonnel and intelligence for the Police Director and other institutional units.33 
The Comando de Operaciones Especiales (COE) was another unit linked to the devel-
opment of PSCs. It was created in 1982 as an operative-specialist unit and was referred to as 
the Batallón de Reacción y Operaciones Especiales (Battalion of Response and Special Opera-
tions; BROE) with police officers of all ranks.34 It had the support of all units of the National 
Police, the Army, and PSCs. Their agents were especially trained by members of the Army 
that were members of PSCs as well: “[…] At 10:00 a.m. the Lieutenant of Military Reserves, 
who works for Alarms of Guatemala,35 arrived with two more agents on board a jeep P–
199390 to offer a cliff-climbing course to members of this Command.”36 
The link between PSCs and police personnel is undisputable, as many PSCs were 
founded by police officers that hired police personnel to staff their security companies. In 
addition, many police unites, especially those with tasked with intelligence work, used PSCs 
as information sources. The military counterinsurgency strategy necessitated the flow of in-
formation between all paramilitary groups in the country, with the police often acting as an 
intermediary between the military and PSCs. Finally, training course contracts were signed 
                                                     
31  Special Report of the Historical Archive of the Guatemalan National Police, (2009): “El derecho a saber”, Pro-
curador General de los Derechos Humanos, Guatemala, cap. II. 
32  Laws Compilation, Guatemala, August 3, 1971. Historic Archive of the Guatemalan National Police. 
33  Special Report of the Historical Archive of the Guatemalan National Police, (2009): “El derecho a saber”, Pro-
curador General de los Derechos Humanos, Guatemala, cap. II, p. 124. 
34  Special Report of the Historical Archive of the Guatemalan National Police, (2009): “El derecho a saber”, Pro-
curador General de los Derechos Humanos, Guatemala, cap. I, p. 44. 
35  “Alarmas de Guatemala” a PSC part of Ébano Group. 
36  Special Report of the Historical Archive of the Guatemalan National Police, (2009): “El derecho a saber”, Pro-
curador General de los Derechos Humanos, Guatemala, cap. II, p. 167. 
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between the police and PSCs. This was an effective means of capturing public funds, and 
thereby strengthening political relations between PSCs and the National Police. 
On the military side, the Mobile Military Police (MMP) was one of the most important 
units providing private security services. The Defense Ministry created the MMP in 1958 to 
combat crime. In 1965, MMP operations were broadened to support the National Police and to 
maintain order in rural and urban areas. The MMP consisted of two tactical units. The Ordi-
nary MMP had a typical military structure and was part of the counterinsurgency strategy. By 
comparison, the Special MMP was for hire. Private companies, farmers and economic elites ob-
tained its services directly through command officers. In 1997, the MMP had 2,421 agents and, 
according to MINUGUA, after its formal dissolution, some MMP agents were reintegrated into 
the National Civil Police and prison system. Most of the rest were hired by PSCs.37 
The demobilization of the MMP after the Peace Agreements left some state interests 
and private clients unprotected (Táger 2002: 92). Security businessmen such as Carlos 
Quintanilla, owner of Particular Protection Services (SERPROP), hired about 60 percent of 
the MMP’s former agents. The economic elites had little trust in the government’s new civil 
security institutions due to the potential for infiltration of former insurgents in security mat-
ters, among other reasons. They preferred to continue commercial relationships with the 
same military officers that had previously provided them with security.38 
As shown above, another mechanism reinforcing PSC proliferation was the incorpora-
tion of international military specialists into the Guatemala’s army. Some of these interna-
tional specialists offered their services as private security companies. These became lucrative 
businesses in the post-war era. 
Since 1974, relations between Guatemala and Israel were characterized by the sale of 
firearms and military training. It has been reported that in 1983 there were 300 Israeli mili-
tary officers working as advisers in Guatemalan security and military intelligence structures. 
Israeli security advisers created security systems in inland farms located in armed-conflict 
areas. The Israelis passed on their expertise in counterinsurgency tactics to Guatemalan mili-
tary officers (Hunter 1987: 36). Business groups also hired Israeli security advisers. As it ap-
proved to be a good business opportunity, the Israelis started PSCs offering security systems 
based on their war experience. After the suspension of US military aid during Carter Ad-
ministration, Israel became the arms supplier of the Guatemalan Army (Hunter 1987; Kur-
tenbach 2008: 16). For example, the Galil assault rifle was the official weapon of the Guate-
malan Army during the internal conflict. Nowadays, Grupo Golán is the largest and oldest 
Israeli private security consortium in Guatemala with approximately 3,000 guards and an in-
calculable number of investigators and security advisers.39 
                                                     
37  Second Inform, General Secretary of MINUGUA, A/52/757, April 15 to December 31, 1997, p. 26. 
38  Interview with Carlos Quintanilla, owner of Servicio de Protección Particular (SERPROP) Guatemala, March 
17, 2009. 
39  Interview with a security consultant of EMISA, Guatemala, March 23, 2009. 
 
Argueta: Private Security in Guatemala 21 
Both mechanisms — private security services from state security institutions and interna-
tional security advisors hired by state military forces — were enhanced during particular criti-
cal junctures. The military power struggles, the dissolution of state security institutions, and 
the military downsizing after the peace agreements allowed the incorporation of former mili-
taries into the private security business. This process can be analyzed at two different moments 
in time: the first during the internal war, and the second in the context of a post-war society. 
In the aftermath of the coup d´etats in 1982 and 1983, the Army expelled many militias. 
For example, former-Captain Rodolfo Muñoz Piloña founded the Unidad de Servicios Inte-
grales de Seguridad (USI) in 1989. This PSC is known as “el cuartelito” (the little garrison) be-
cause it is headed with strong military discipline. It became a safe working place for former 
officers who participated in the 1982 coup. Security companies like USI grouped together a 
large number of former military officers, who continued to control the Army networks and 
security structures they had helped establish.40 
The second moment occurred after the post-war downsizing of military personnel. The 
Army reform process was implemented in two stages. The first was the downsizing of per-
sonnel, and the second involved the reintegration of former officers into democratic civilian 
life. As the second phase was never implemented, it allowed for the uncontrolled incorpora-
tion of military officers into civil life, with a large number of unemployed officers and sol-
diers being reintegrated by the private sector41. PSCs, organized crime, and drug trafficking, 
among other things, were the informal mechanisms of reincorporation for military personnel 
into society.42 It’s important to emphasize that the downsizing of the army paralleled the in-
crease of crime and proliferation of PSCs. 
Table 3: Military Downsizing in Guatemala 
Year Military  
personnel 
Official  
reduction 
Percent Remaining  
military personnel 
1997–1998 46,900 15,477 33 31,423 
2003 31,423   4,209        8.97 27,214 
2004 27,214 11,714     24.97 15,500 
Total reduction 1997/2004  31,400     66.95 15,500 
Source: MINUGUA 2004: “Final Report. The Consultancy of the Strengthening of Civilian Power” in Ten Years 
of Work of MINUGUA in Guatemala, Guatemala City, 2004. 
The origins of private security within the state show how the proliferation of these services 
occurred on the basis of a pre-existing displacement process of state security functions. The 
existence of mechanisms that reinforce a particular institutional arrangement in politically 
critical junctures confirms the argument that the characteristics of private security in contexts 
of post-war societies are better explained by placing the phenomenon within a time frame. 
                                                     
40  Interview with Carlos Rodolfo Muñoz Piloña, Guatemala, March 17, 2009. 
41  Interview with a security consultant of EMISA, Guatemala, March 23, 2009. 
42  Interview with Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, Berlin, Germany, February 2, 2009. 
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4 Noncommercial Private Security: The Case of the Juntas Locales de Seguridad 
The juntas locales de seguridad43 (JLSs) are neighborhood and communal groups organized to 
protect their living area. Their activities vary — they can hire PSCs, or they can do the guard-
ing themselves while in possession of illegal weapons, and with their faces covered. As a 
structure of civil self-defense, the JLSs represent one type among many in the wide spectrum 
of civil organizations that support the state’s role of social and political control. Social control 
and the incorporation of civilian populations into security structures is a historical constant 
which, in the case of Guatemala, has accompanied the state since its liberal restructuring dur-
ing the second half of the nineteenth century. 
4.1 Continuity and Change of Control Mechanisms 
According to Holden (1996), civil security organizations can be analyzed from the perspec-
tive of the function that caudillos and their supporters had in the building of the state in Cen-
tral America. The use of institutions for political control has historical authoritarian origins. 
During the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico (1931–1944), the public administration was designed 
to facilitate social control, from the central state administration to the communal level. The 
Jefaturas Políticas and Comandancias de Armas coordinated the activities of Intendencias 
Municipales and Comandancias de Plaza. This meant coordination between departmental 
and communal levels. Social conflicts were resolved through this administrative hierarchy 
and with the help of corresponding civil organizations, such as the Auxilios Civiles (Civil 
Auxiliary) and Military Commissioner. They served different functions, such as surveillance, 
enforcing the legitimacy of state authorities, and the organization of patrols. Their main 
function was to be an extension of state security. The names of the Auxilios Civiles varied, 
however there were minimal functional differences. They were known as regidores (regents), 
auxiliaries (supplemental officers), patrulleros (squad or platoon), guardabosques (forest rang-
ers), police, milicianos (militiamen), mayores (mayors) and alguaciles (sheriffs). The common 
feature among them was social control; the differences refer to the type of work they per-
formed and the administrative entity to which they were assigned (Argueta 2004: 88). 
Jorge Ubico created the Military Commissioners in 1938 based on a pre-existing colo-
nial system of control. He tasked them with helping the Army maintain social control from 
within the civilian population. They were the “eyes and ears” of the military.44 
                                                     
43  There are different names for security civil organizations in Guatemala. This paper uses the acronym JLS (Jun-
tas Locales de Seguridad) to refer to security civil organizations as a general concept. When necessary, this 
paper will specify the names and differences. The term “boards” refers to a decision group in a community — 
in some cases elected, and in other cases self-appointed. 
44  Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) 1999. Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, Cap. II, 
Vol. 1, p. 424. Online: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/mds/spanish/cap2/vol1/cmil.html#Note1. 
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During the internal war (1960–1996), the counterinsurgency reactivated historical 
mechanisms of social and security control. The military had a complex network of institu-
tions, actors and organizations under their formal and informal control, extending from the 
national central of power to communal organizations (Schirmer 2001). 
One part of the counter insurgency strategy was the reactivation of a Military Commis-
sioners network. In 1966, there were approximately 5,000 Military Commissioners involved 
in military operations against armed insurgent groups.45 By the end of the 1980s, there where 
approximately 35,000 Military Commissioners throughout the country. Their functions 
ranged from controlling social and political activities in communities and neighborhoods, to 
denouncing criminals and organizing security operations (Táger 2002: 92). 
Another part of the counterinsurgent strategy was the reactivation of Civil Auto-
Defense Patrols (PACs; Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil), which organized approximately one 
million civilians in 1986. The organizational structure and activities of the PACs during the 
internal war were different in each region. One of the main functions assigned to the PACs 
during the internal war was monitoring and denouncing people and situations that caused 
suspicion (Sáenz 2004: 50). Civil Patrols contributed to the structuring of an authoritarian 
communal organization, and in 1999 it was estimate that PACs committed 18 percent of all 
human rights violations committed during the internal conflict (CEH 1999: 109). 
Despite their formal dissolution in 1996, they reincorporated over the past twenty years 
into a new local power structure (Táger 2002: 93). The actual number and location of PAC 
members is difficult to estimate. The number of PACs formally demobilized in 1995 was cal-
culated to be 274,215 (Saenz 2004). Ten years later, after their reorganization as a social 
movement that requested governmental financial support, the number of former PACs was 
estimated to be 493,504. 
The Army has historically been the institutional tool for a mechanism of power sharing 
between state and nonstate actors in a political arena where the line between public and pri-
vate sphere has been diffused. After revising the historical context of civil security organiza-
tions it is possible to argue that the JLSs are only one part of a larger and more complex sys-
tem of informal society-state collaborations in security and control matters. 
4.2 Juntas Locales de Seguridad in Post-war Society 
The formal creation of JLSs started in July 1999 after the National Civil Police issued a general 
order to address public security. In 2001, 231 JLSs were registered.46 In 2009, the PNC reported 
                                                     
45  Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) 1999. Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, Cap. II, 
Vol. 1, p. 427. 
46  Annual Report 2008, Community Relations Division, Civil National Police. 
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1,029 JLSs.47 The JLSs are under the coordination and supervision of the Subdirección General 
de Prevención del Delito (General Crime-Prevention Directorate), established in 2005. 
One state intelligence officer argued that JLSs degenerated with regard to their original 
objectives since their formal creation in 1999, because they were used as an information re-
source for the police.48 Since the police historically planted informants in communities and 
neighborhoods, the population quickly rejected the work of the JLSs, and a desired collabora-
tion with the police was impossible. Nevertheless, the JLSs were organized and are still 
working without relation to the police.49 
The activities of the JLSs are linked to violent phenomena such as lynching, kidnap-
pings and extortions. For example, the San Juan Sacatepéquez JLSs have approximately two 
hundred members, many of them former military officers, former insurgents, and members 
of criminal groups.50 Due to violent acts perpetrated by some JLSs, the civilian population 
organized other security groups to protect themselves. The existence of different security or-
ganizations has reactivated traditional conflicts, such as territorial disputes, the distribution 
of local power, and social protests against open mines. The JLSs are not a product of the call 
for community organization made by the police in 1999; they are a product of their own 
community and neighborhood history, particularly in those areas with a history of strong 
violent activity during the internal conflict.51 
Another example of the reactivation of former control mechanisms can be seen in the 
community of Los Cimientos, in El Quiche. The violent activities of the Civil Patrol’s former 
members forced more than 50 families to leave the community in 2007. The former PACs re-
named themselves “Communitarian leaders,” remained heavily armed, and never changed 
their former activities and structures or stopped killing suspects and intimidating the commu-
nity. They took control of the local institutions and forced the population to create civil patrols.52 
There are some specific differences between civil security organizations in rural and 
urban areas. The JLSs are mostly organized in rural areas and have less of a military pres-
ence. Their actions depend on the organizational history of the region, and do not have a di-
rect correlation with criminal rates. The JLSs are mostly organized in low-income regions 
where the hiring PSCs is not possible. 
In the metropolitan area of Guatemala City, the JLSs are organized through the Comi-
tés Únicos de Barrio (Unique Neighborhood Committees), which are, in turn, directed by the 
municipality of Guatemala City. They are organized in areas that have a median income and 
a mostly nonindigenous population. Each neighborhood committee has a military represen-
                                                     
47  Annual Report 2010, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala. 
48  Interview with an officer of the State Intelligence Office, Guatemala, March 5, 2009. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid. 
52  Prensa Libre, May 21, 2007. 
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tative collecting information for the Army (but not the police).53 The roll played by military 
officials in its activities is an extension of the Joint Patrols Program (Army and Civil National 
Police). These patrols have been widely criticized because they are mechanisms through with 
the military continues to participate in public security tasks. 
Metropolitan districts 1 and 9 consist of approximately one million inhabitants, and 
have 200 neighborhood committees. These organizations prefer military rather than police 
support because they have more trust in the Army, and expect the Army to solve the crimi-
nality problem with an “iron fist.”54 
The hiring of PSCs and the self-organization into committees is a double mechanism 
used to protect themselves against criminality. There are cases where a neighborhood secu-
rity organization is promoted by a PSC. The Hotel Security Council of Guatemala promotes 
the informal organization of neighborhoods around tourist areas, and has representatives in 
every security committee that collect information about criminal activities.55 
The political structures created during the internal conflict were the mechanisms for 
the accelerated proliferation of JLSs. The hazard of organizing JLSs where no necessity exists, 
is the possibility of reactivating previous authoritarian structures. The interviewee explained 
that the homogeneous design of JLSs does not take into account each community’s cultural 
traditions and historical conflicts, because it is a model of organization created by the central 
administration of the security institutions.56 In most cases, the population was already organ-
ized before its contact with state institutions. This situation produces negative effects for the 
rule of law, and reduces confidence in the judicial system. “Private justice” is normally ap-
plied in the form of lynching or social cleansing. However, the positive or negative actions of 
the JLSs depend largely on the historical organizational culture of the region. 
4.3 Homicide Rates and Juntas Locales de Seguridad 
As mentioned in the literature review, the proliferation of neighborhood security committees 
is commonly associated with an increase in crime and weak public institutions. The results of 
this study show that in the case of Guatemala, the continuity of control mechanisms is a 
more accurate explanation for the proliferation of such organizations. 
The analysis of homicide rates and JLSs illustrates two important points: the low homi-
cide rates in indigenous communities, and the lack of a clear correlation between poverty 
rates and homicide rates. In fact, the greater the poverty rate, the lower the rate of homicides. 
                                                     
53  Interview with Priscila de Narciso, Auxiliary Mayor of District 9 of the metropolitan area, Guatemala City, 
March 18, 2009. 
54  Interview with Rubén Darío Martínez, Auxiliary Mayor of District 1 of the metropolitan area, Guatemala City, 
March 23, 2009. 
55  Interview with security system director the Guatemalan Hotel Security Council. Guatemala, February 24, 
2009. 
56  Interview with an officer of the State Intelligence Office, Guatemala, March 5, 2009. 
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This is especially true in areas with a majority indigenous population (Totonicapán, Quiché, 
Sololá, Alta Verapaz, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, San Marcos). There are also depart-
ments with high poverty rates, low indigenous population, and high homicide rates (Jalapa, 
Santa Rosa and Chiquimula). The extreme case is the metropolitan area of Guatemala City, 
which as lower poverty rates but higher homicide rates. 
While homicide is not related to poverty, extreme social inequality generally produces 
a serious social tension.57 One implication of this is the high level of perceived insecurity. 
Lack of security is perceived to be Guatemala City’s principal social malaise, although it is 
not related to the actual situation of criminality (UNDP 2007). Numerous studies have at-
tempted to explain that this perception of insecurity and the reactions it provokes are based 
on differing social discourses that are related to political and social phenomena not directly 
linked with the causes of violence (Huhn, Oettler and Peetz 2006a, 2006b). 
Figure 5: Homicide and Poverty Rates 
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Source: Author’s own compilation with data from Civil National Police of Guatemala (2008) and ENCOVI 
(2008). 
The question now is if the homicide rates, as well as poverty rates and ethnic characteristics, 
explain the presence of JLSs in certain areas. There are areas with high homicide rates and a 
majority nonindigenous population that have few JLSs (Petén, Izabal, and Chiquimula). On 
the other hand, departments like San Marcos, Alta Verapaz, and Quiché have low homicide 
rates, majority indigenous populations, and a high number of JLSs. The remaining depart-
ments with majority of indigenous populations and high poverty rates (Totonicapán, Sololá, 
Huehuetenango, Baja Verapaz, and Chimaltenango) have a typical number of JLSs. 
                                                     
57  According to UNDP, Guatemala is one of the countries in Latin America with the greatest inequality. Informe 
Estadístico de la Violencia en Guatemala, UNDP, 2007, p. 10. 
 
Argueta: Private Security in Guatemala 27 
Figure 6: Homicide Rates and Number of JLSs 
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Source: Annual Report 2008, Community Relations Division, Civil National Police. 
The extent of the nation’s police coverage is not a strong indicator of a JLS presence. Al-
though there is no acknowledged standard for judging what constitutes adequate police cov-
erage, the number of police officers in Guatemala is nonetheless low in relation to the popu-
lation.58 In 2006, Guatemala had approximately 30,000 police officers, or about 1.56 police of-
ficers for 100,000 inhabitants, which is equivalent to 0.19 police officers per square kilome-
ter.59 Most of them are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Guatemala City, where there 
are a large number of JLSs, as well as a high homicide rate. In regions like Quiché and Alta 
Verapáz, there is lower police coverage, lower homicide rates, and strong presence of JLSs. 
The main argument addressing addressed here is that the continuity of social and po-
litical control mechanisms and an organizational history of a certain area are stronger ex-
planatory factors for JLS proliferation. 
Most of the political violence committed during the internal war was concentrated in 
areas with majority indigenous populations that had a strong tradition of communal organi-
zation. Approximately 83.3 percent of the victims of human rights violations committed dur-
ing the internal conflict were of Mayan ethnicity (CEH 1999). With the exception of Petén and 
Guatemala City, five of the eight departments with the most human rights violations during 
the internal were areas with majority indigenous populations and structural poverty. 
                                                     
58  Informe de Desarrollo Humano para America Central 2009–2010, UNDP. 
59  Data provided by the Civil National Police of Guatemala. This data does not distinguish those agents dedi-
cated to administrative work. Data available in: <www.encovi.com>. 
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Figure 7: Percentage of Human Rights Violations Guatemala (1962–1996) 
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Source: Comisión del Esclarecimiento Histórico, Cap. 2, Vol. I, 1999. 
Figure 8 shows that 54 percent of the population which was organized into a PAC was con-
centrated in the seven departments with majority indigenous populations.60 The case of To-
tonicapán is an interesting exception. Due to its historically strong organizational culture, the 
community refused to participate in either PACs or insurgency security structures. Nowa-
days there are only a small number of JLSs in the department. 
Likewise, the percentage of human rights violations committed by Military Commission-
ers was especially high in areas with majority-indigenous populations. With the exception of 
Zapaca, the remaining departments match those departments with a high rate of human rights 
violations and presence of PACs, and are nowadays departments with high number of JLSs. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the proliferation of noncommercial private security is 
not directly caused by an increase in crime, ethnic characteristics, poverty rates, or institutional 
security coverage. The explaining factors of criminality appear to be different from those fac-
tors generally used to explain private security responses. Noncommercial private security rein-
forces historical mechanisms of self-defense against perceived or potential threats. The ten-
dency to transfer public security functions to the population can result in violent and authori-
tarian practices, as well as increased popular distrust, and deterioration of the rule of law. 
                                                     
60  This percentage was calculated based on the number of people that in 2005 required payment for its services 
as a PAC. Tejada (2004). 
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Figure 8: Number of Former PACs that requested Compensation(2004–2003) 
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Source: Author’s own compilation with data from Saenz de Tejada, Ricardo (2004): ¿víctimas o vencedores? Una 
aproximación al movimiento de los ex pac, Facultad latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) 
Guatemala. 
Figure 9: Percentage of Human Rights Violations Committed by Military Commissioners 
(1962–1996) 
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Source: Comisión del Esclarecimiento Histórico, Cap. 2, Vol. I, 1999. 
30 Argueta: Private Security in Guatemala 
5 Conclusion: The Reinforcement Mechanisms of Private Security Proliferation 
In this section, previously discussed arguments are integrated into an explanatory frame-
work with regard to the proliferation of private security services in Guatemala, and the cor-
responding displacement of public security institutions. 
According to path-dependent approaches, the emergence and proliferation of private 
security can be viewed as a repeated selection dependent on its reinforced function in differ-
ent political contexts and critical junctures. There is an overlapping of sequences at the time 
of the incorporation of different actors in the process. This dynamic reinforces the function of 
private security in the general social system. An interplay of reinforcement mechanisms and 
critical junctures leads to the consolidation of a strong private security sector. 
Figure 10: Self-reinforcing Sequence of Private Security Proliferation in Guatemala 
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Source: Author’s own compilation. 
The first reinforcement mechanism is the continuity of social and political control structures 
(Military Commissioners, Civil Patrols, among others). While the structure and quantity of 
these mechanisms change, the control function is replicated to operate in the direction of 
new targets. This is not a linear process. This analysis’s emphasis is on their social function, 
and how this function reproduces itself in a new sequence. The motivations for this kind of 
organization can vary: dictatorial control in the 1930s; counterinsurgency in the 1980s; and 
today’s fight against crime. The functions that remain constant are self-defense and social 
control. They are reinforced by state security institutions or civil organizations. 
Insecurity (real or perceived) is the present justification for the reactivation of historical 
mechanisms for social control, and for the implementation of practices that are often violent 
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and authoritarian. But noncommercial private security is also reinforced by social differentia-
tions introduced by PSCs. 
The second reinforcement mechanism is the creation of PSCs by members of state secu-
rity forces. This mechanism has been reinforced at different critical junctures in accordance 
with political processes, and it shows how the proliferation of private security services has its 
origins in state security institutions. It appears that the displacement to the private sector of 
certain state functions has stimulated the sector’s strengthening, which helps explain the sec-
tor’s increased ability to penetrate public institutions. 
The third mechanism buttressing the proliferation of private security services was the 
creation of PSCs by civilian entrepreneurs. This phenomenon began in the banking security 
sector, and quickly spread to commercial and personal security. PSCs have a formidable link 
to state security institutions through the recruitment of National Police agents or former 
army officers. 
The fourth reinforcing mechanism is the creation of private security services by inter-
national military consultants. Israeli companies hired by the Army during the war, which 
continue to combine security services with firearms sales, are a good example of this trend. 
The fifth mechanism is the entrance of military officers into the security business. This 
occurred at different junctures, during the internal war and in the post-war era. The transi-
tion to democracy has not resulted in full civilian domination over the army. The coexistence 
of some democratic prerogatives and authoritarian structures accurately defines the charac-
teristic tensions between a weak political civil sector and a strong political army (Karl 1995; 
Koonings 2003). The persistence of “reserved domains” of military power over security insti-
tutions has moved from formal institutional structures to informal mechanisms in order to 
ensure its continuity. The control of private security services is one of those mechanisms of 
continuity. These processes have been of benefit to the Army because they reinforce its role 
as the only state institution capable of guaranteeing public security. 
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